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BY JOHN

H. JACKSON
The fallowing essay is an excerpt adapted
from The World Trading System: Law and
Policy of International Economic
Relations, Second Edition, being published

infall 1997 by the MIT Press.
It is printed here with permission.

Imagine you are a congressman, and the president comes to you and
says he needs authority to negotiate with foreign nations for the reduction
of nontariff measures (NTMs) which are restricting trade. The tariff
problem, although not extinguished, has been largely resolved by multiple
rounds of GATT negotiations, but now NTMs are proving damaging to the
principles of comparative advantage and to world welfare. The president
would like advance authority for NTM negotiations along the pattern of
the traditional tariff authority. The problem is that nontariff measures
reach deeply into the interstices of domestic policy and regulations. The
Congress has fought lengthy battles on many such issues, including
environmental standards, product liability and purity requirements for
medicines. The Congress does not relish the prospect of a president
changing all its work through the implementation of international
agreements. So you advise the president to negotiate all he wants, but to
bring back for congressional approval any agreements he completes.
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The presidents answer is that such a
procedure is not acceptable to foreign
governments, who see it as a way for U.S.
negotiators to get "two bites of the apple."
The negotiators and their political superiors
spend "political chips" by the compromises
necessary to obtain an international
agreement. These will cost governments
some loss of votes in' the next elections, but
will be worth it if they can demonstrate that
some advantage will ensue from the
agreement. But when the delicately
balanced draft agreement is submitted to
Congress (or to other parliaments), then it
can all come unraveled, as those bodies find
clauses objectionable or feel their
negotiators should have obtained more .
Major portions of the_results of the
Kennedy Round of GAIT trade negotiations
were never approved by the U.S. Congress,
and foreign officials remember this. They
also remember the history of congressional
refusal to approve the ITO and the OTC.
What should one do1 Some sort of
middle way must be sought. This was the
thinking of the drafters in the early 1970s
as they prepared the bill that finally became
the 1974 Trade Act. One idea was to tum
to a procedure that had a long but
controversial history in the United States the legislative veto. This procedure basically
called for the president to establish an
order, regulations, or international draft
agreement; submit that to the Congress;
and if the Congress did not - within a
specified time by a specified majority disapprove the measure, it came into effect
and became valid law. But, although many
foreign governments, and a number of state
governments in the United States, have
used the legislative veto, the constitutional
doctrine of "separation of powers" has been
used to argue against it.
Early drafts of the 1974 legislation
provided a fairly elaborate legislative veto
provision as a way to resolve the apparent
dilemma of the need for U.S. NTM
negotiating credibility - that is, a
procedure that improved the chance that
U.S. officials could "deliver" on a
commitment to accept an international
agreement, while not giving the president a
"blank check." Under this draft procedure,
the president , before final completion of a
draft international agreement, would
consult with the Congress, and be partly
guided by their views of the draft
agreement in progress. Then, when the
draft agreement was completed, he would
prepare proposed legislation to approve and

■----------------------------------implement it which, if the legislation was
not disapproved by the Congress, would
become law.
The House of Representatives accepted
this procedure, but when it went to the
Senate, the political atmosphere was
different. The Watergate scandal had
recently been uncovered, and the Senate
Finance Committee was reluctant to
approve delegations of authority to a
president under such a cloud. (In fact, the
bill did not make much progress until after
President Nixon resigned and President
Ford took office.) Even though there were
other legislative veto procedures which were
not challenged, the one relating to nontariff
measures was too significant. Consequently,
the Senate committee drafted an alternative
that became law, and this has been termed
the "fast-track" procedure.
The fast-track procedure for approval of
the results of international negotiations on
nontariff measures was an attempt to retain
the essential features of the legislative veto.
In addition to the consultation requirement,
the fast-track provided three essential rules:
■ A bill, when introduced, would not
be amendable;
■ Committees to which the bill was
referred would be required to report out
the bill within a short period of time;
and
■ Debate over the bill in both Houses
was limited.
These rules were not statutory; however,
they were included in the rules of each
House of Congress, and were subject to
change through parliamentary procedure
that excluded the president. Thus, the
procedures were not quite so stable as a
statutory "legislative veto" would have been.
It should be noted that this procedure is
constitutionally the same as that of adopting
a statute. Further, if a statute is adopted, the
statute itself cures most conceivable
departures from the fast-track procedure.
For example, if the proposed bill were to go
beyond the scope of subject matter
contemplated in the fast-track procedure,
but the Congress were to adopt it anyway
(and the president were to sign it), then the
statute would be valid because the
Constitution would be fulfilled and the
deviance would be "cured."

The fast-track procedure worked very
well during the 1979 enactment of approval
and implementation of the Tokyo Round
results. Surprisingly, the relevant
congressional committees developed a
procedure for the consultation period,
under which those committees played a
role very similar to their role in normal
legislation, with "non-mark up," and a
"nonconference" to reconcile differences
between the House and the Senate. These
committees and the lawyers for the
Congress actually developed the draft
legislation, which they wanted the president
to introduce for the fast-track procedure.
The presidents bill was almost identical to
the bill developed by the Congress, and
partly for this reason the bill was adopted by
an astounding 395 to 7 in the House, and
90 to 4 in the Senate.
Subsequently, in 1983 the U.S. Supreme
Court, in the case INS v. Chadha, held that a
legislative veto procedure was not
permissible under the U.S. Constitution.
Fortunately, the trade act fast-track
procedure was not threatened. Certain other
trade act "vetoes," however, were
subsequently changed because of this case.
The fast-track procedure has in fact been
suggested as a plausible alternative to
legislative vetoes in other types of statutes.
The trade act fast-track procedure, like
the tariff authority, however, has a duration
limit. Satisfaction with the procedure led
the Congress in the 1979 act to extend the
original time of expiry from 5 January 1980
to 5 January 1988. This procedure was
considered so important that in 1986, at
the beginning of negotiations between
Canada and the U.S. for a free trade area,
Canada insisted on the fast-track
application for the negotiation results.
Subsequently, other nations have expressed
similar views.
The 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act renewed the fast-track
procedure for possible use in the Uruguay
Round, and also in the NAFTA
negotiations. It was clear that this
procedure was deemed essential by foreign
negotiating partners in both of those
negotiations. Indeed, the deadline for the
Uruguay Round fast-track motivated the
negotiation deadline throughout the
Uruguay Round. When the 1990
ministerial meeting scheduled to finish the
Uruguay Round failed, a special procedure
for extending the deadline of the fast-track
was necessary (and accomplished during
1991). This fast-track then was scheduled

to expire in 1993, but the newly elected
Clinton administration was not prepared to
move so quickly, and thus the fast-track was
extended again, its final deadline requiring
that an agreement be signed by 15 April
1994, and indeed that was the date of
signature at Marrakesh. There is much
debate about whether the fast-track should
or will be used again, bur it appears quite
clear that it will be an essential ingredient of
future trade negotiations.
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